I. INTRODUCTION HIS article surveys the most significant changes in intellectual property law in the past year.' The article considers only those decisions that are precedential in Texas. The cases cited are limited to decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Federal Circuits. For developments in trademark and copyright law, the Fifth Circuit's authority is binding. Additionally, because all cases concerning a substantive issue of patent law are appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, decisions from the Federal Circuit during the survey period are also included in this article. 2 2006 was quite a year for intellectual property. The United States Supreme Court showed the most interest in patent cases since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982. From revisiting patent doctrines thought to be long-settled to actively taking up the issues of what is patentable subject matter, the highest court in the land is signaling the importance of patents to our economy and the need for modem adjustments to the current state of the law. Whether due to patent friendly venues or the threat of taking their BlackBerry® devices, patent litigation has also received considerable attention from members of Congress who continue to propose patent reform legislation. 3 A unanimous Court held that victorious patent holders are not entitled to automatic injunctive relief against infringers; rather, they must satisfy the same four-factor test applicable to non-patent-related requests for permanent injunctions:
4 Specifically,
[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
5
This holding overturned the Federal Circuit's "general rule" that "courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances." '6 While the decision was unanimous, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy authored competing concurrences that offered starkly different views on the application of the four-factor test to plaintiffs who did not themselves practice their inventions (i.e., patent holders who only licensed their inventions). Chief Justice Roberts indicated that the decision should not cause courts to disregard the history of providing injunctive relief in patent cases, as the Court was not "writing on an entirely clean slate."
7 Justice Kennedy, in contrast, wrote that recent changes in the patent marketplace may dictate less frequent granting of permanent injunctions because "legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest." ' 8 Kennedy also noted that "the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a violation of that right," 9 and, therefore, the trial court should have broad discretion to determine adequate relief. ing licenses, and the practices of competitors, patent holders, and patent holding companies. The split concurrences discussed above left the law unsettled, and some district courts-primarily those in Texas-have had an opportunity to apply the decision to particular facts in cases before them. It appears that Justice Kennedy's approach has taken hold. Although the Federal Circuit has yet to give its take on the remand of eBay, 1 1 injunctions appear more difficult for patent holders to obtain. Not surprisingly, the patent-heavy dockets of the Eastern District of Texas were the first to publish an opinion applying the "new" eBay standard. In z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,14 z4 sought to enforce its patent for methods of limiting unauthorized software use. 15 z4 prevailed at trial, with the jury finding defendants Microsoft and Autodesk liable for willful infringement and total damages in excess of $130 million. 16 With its trial victory in hand, z4 moved for a permanent injunction against Microsoft.
17
In its reasoning, the district court looked heavily to the eBay opinion, especially Justice Kennedy's concurrence. It noted that Microsoft and z4 were not direct competitors. Also, z4's patented invention was "in no way related to the core functionality for which the software is purchased by consumers," 18 and was only a small part of Microsoft's Windows and Office products that the issuance of an injunction would impact. 19 These facts matched the sort of circumstances Justice Kennedy pointed to when suggesting the possible sufficiency of legal damages. 20 Because Microsoft did not license z4's methods but only used them in its own products, z4's 13. While the emphasis on competition between the parties seems consistent, courts do not appear to have found a consistently favored alternative remedy for ongoing infringement when an injunction is denied. As the cases that follow demonstrate, courts have done everything from severing ongoing infringement into a new cause of action to granting the infringer a license. Remedies utilized by courts in lieu of a permanent injunction will be one of the most interesting areas of patent litigation to watch in 2007.
14. [Vol. 60 1146 ability to license the technology to the market was unimpeded, and z4 could not show "irreparable harm." ' 21 Further, the "balance of hardships" 22 tilted heavily in Microsoft's favor. Redesigning existing products already in place presented Microsoft with an enormous task, while leaving the authentication system in place did little to harm z4's business. 23 Also consistent with Kennedy's concurrence, the district court provided for a further legal remedy for z4, in lieu of the equitable relief, by severing z4's causes of action for post-verdict infringement of z4's patents. 24 ii. Hybrid Approach Backfires: Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
The district court's reasoning in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. 25 paralleled the reasoning used in z4. Patentee Paice sued Toyota for infringement of its patents via Toyota's production of hybrid-drive vehicles. 26 After applying the doctrine of equivalents, the jury found that Toyota infringed two claims but that the infringement was not willful.
27
Following the verdict, Paice moved for permanent injunction. 28 Like many patent holders, Paice derived revenue from its patent through a hybrid of infringement suits and licenses. Paice argued that Toyota's infringement impeded attempts to license the patent, thus causing irreparable harm. The district court found no evidence that Toyota's use in manufacturing caused irreparable harm to licensing efforts by the patentee 29 and that the infringing use was only a small aspect of the infringing product. 30 In an ironic twist, the district court pointed to Paice's unremarkable offer to license the patent to Toyota as evidence of the sufficiency of monetary damages.
31
iii. License against will: Finisar Corp. v. The DirecTV Group, Inc.
In Finisar Corp. v. The DirecTV Group, Inc., 32 the district court provided for a more remarkable result, but it gave less insight into its reasoning. The patentee Finisar alleged that DirecTV had infringed its patent that disclosed a system to deliver information to consumers through satellite TV. 3 3 Following a jury verdict of willful infringement resulting in damages in excess of $100 million, patent holder Finisar sought a perma- nent injunction. 34 The district court not only denied the injunction, but it also granted DirecTV a compulsory license for continued use of Finisar's patents. 35 Finisar argued that it would be unable to sell an exclusive license without the injunction, but the district court found the awarded damages, which it had enhanced, to be adequate compensation. Aside from the above comments generally addressing the state of patent law, Justice Breyer focused his opinion on Metabolite's method patent. At issue was whether Metabolite's patent for diagnosing vitamin deficiencies based on the levels of an amino acid improperly sought to "claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship. '45 Laboratory Corporation had licensed Metabolite's patent, but it stopped paying the licensing fee when it began using a test offered by a competitor. 46 Metabolite sued, alleging that any test infringed its patent if it involved the correlation between amino acid levels and a vitamin deficiency. 47 Justice Breyer explained that the prohibition on the patenting of laws of nature was based on the general concern over the appropriate scope of patent law. 48 He concluded that Metabolite's patenting of the correlation between amino acids and vitamin levels was invalid as a non-patentable "phenomenon of nature" and was "no more than an instruction to read some numbers in light of medical knowledge." '49 3. Mutiny on the License: MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
Argued the first week of October, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 50 was, unsurprisingly, the first patent case of the Supreme Court's 2006-2007 term. MedImmune licensed a patent from Genentech covering a respiratory drug and then later brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the patent. 51 Because MedImmune had a valid license with Genentech at the time it sued, the district court relied on Federal Circuit precedent in Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. 52 and granted a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 5 the Federal Circuit established the rule that a licensee is not under threat of suit from the patent holder and therefore lacks standing to challenge the patent's validity. 54 Thus, to challenge the validity of a licensed patent, a licensee would be required to first breach the license contract. 55 Following Gen-Probe, the district court in MedImmune ruled that the presence of a valid license meant that there was no case or controversy between the parties and, thus, no Article III standing. 56 The Federal Circuit affirmed, relying on the Gen-Probe precedent.
7
Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Scalia reversed the Federal Circuit decision. Rather than relying on the Federal Circuit's established rule in patent cases, Scalia applied the more generally applicable law regarding standing. Much of Scalia's reasoning turned on the licensing agreement between the parties, which he found did not presume the patents it concerned to be valid. 58 Later, he concluded that "promising to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their invalidity. ' '59 Also, Scalia focused on the presence of an imminent threat of suit, analogizing the case to situations outside of patent law where parties have not been required to expose themselves to liability before they could sue for declaratory judgment. 60 In doing so, he focused on the coercive effect of treble damages should MedImmune lose in a suit that required a breach of the license to be initiated. 6 1 Justice Scalia explained that his ruling was consistent with the Court's prior ruling in Altvater v. Freeman, 62 where the Court had also upheld a licensee's right to sue for declaratory judgment without breaching a license that was established by court injunction.
63
How broadly this ruling will impact existing licensing agreements has not yet been determined. Future courts may very well distinguish MedImmune on the facts of the case or the terms in the contract. It is also likely that future contracts will contain some sort of "MedImmune" clause that either establishes the presumed validity of the patents covered or makes clear that a suit will act as breach of the contract. 64 At the center of the controversy is the appropriate test for obviousness: the determination of whether or not a patent is innovative in light of the prior art, or whether "the differences between .the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. '65 To make this determination, both the patent office and the courts look to a test that has been developed over twenty-five years, since shortly after the Federal Circuit's formation in 1982.66 This test is referred to as "teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine" ("TSM") and requires the party seeking invalidity to "establish some 'suggestion, teaching, or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed. ' 67 The Federal Circuit created the TSM test as a way to protect patents against hindsight analysis, since the solution to a problem frequently seems "obvious" in retrospect. This test has been used in hundreds of cases as the basis for determining the validity of patents and by the Patent and Trademark Office in their evaluation of thousands of patents each year. 68 However, during oral argument before the Supreme Court, the test was labeled "gobbledygook" by Justice Scalia and "worse than meaningless" by Chief Justice Roberts. The patent in KSR pertained to an adjustable pedal assembly utilizing an electronic throttle control for an automobile. An adjustable pedal assembly allows the position of the pedals in a vehicle to be changed to accommodate drivers of varying leg length, while an electronic throttle substitutes for its mechanical predecessor, which relied on cables. Both of these elements existed in the prior art. 70 The alleged innovation of Plaintiff Teleflex's patent involved the placement of the electronic control and the design of the entire assembly resulting in a "simplified vehicle control pedal assembly that is less expensive, and which uses fewer parts The Federal Circuit reversed in an unpublished opinion, finding "that the district court's analysis applied an incomplete teaching-suggestionmotivation test in granting KSR summary judgment."
Obviously
73 It found that the district court had invalidated the patent on obviousness grounds "without making 'findings as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of the invention to make the combination in the manner claimed."74 In October 2005, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief, and in June 2006, the court granted certiorari. The patent involved a reading machine for the blind. 78 The Federal Circuit emphasized the importance of avoiding hindsight in making the determination of obviousness, requiring the Board to "articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention" and emphasizing that "when the Board does not explain the motivation, or the suggestion or teaching, .... we infer that the Board used hindsight to conclude that the invention was obvious." ' 79 This requirement clearly stated, that "[a] suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior art." 80 88 The patent asserted by plaintiff Dystar concerned a process for dyeing cloth. 89 In reversing the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law on behalf of the defendants, the Federal Circuit continued to emphasize the flexibility of the TSM test as well as its importance in preventing hindsight, citing both Kahn and Alza. 90 Remarkably, the Federal Circuit's discussion of the TSM test specifically addressed criticisms aimed at the test by outside commentators, refuting characterizations of the test as a "rigid categorical rule." 9 1 Dystar had argued that the court's TSM test required that the cited references contain an explicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine. 92 The Federal Circuit responded that such a view "misreads this court's cases and misdescribes our suggestion test, echoing notions put forth recently by various commentators and accepted in major reports," continuing on to name reports by the Federal Trade Commission and the National Academy of Science. 93 Later, the Federal Circuit warned against "the danger inherent in focusing on isolated dicta" and observed that "our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only permits, but requires, consideration of common knowledge and common sense." ' 95 In the end, the Federal Circuit applied the TSM test to find the patented dyeing process obvious. 96 Significantly, Kahn, Alza, and Dystar all reached the conclusion that the claims of the patent-in-question were obvious based on implicit, rather than explicit, indications of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine in the prior art.
c. Supreme Court Response
The Federal Circuit's efforts to better characterize its test did not prevent the Supreme Court from taking a harsh view of the TSM test during oral argument. As mentioned above, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia seemed to find the test particularly bothersome. 97 Also, Justice Breyer indicated great difficulty in understanding what was meant by a "motivation" to combine, while Justice Souter referred to the current test as an "error. ' '98 However, the Federal Circuit's efforts did not go unnoticed. Justice Alito questioned, "Well, once you define the teaching, suggestion and motivation test that way so it can be implicit... I don't quite understand the difference between that and simply asking whether it's obvious. Could you just explain what it adds?"
99
The Justices did seem concerned about the consequences of discarding the test. Justice Souter asked, if the test was changed, "are there going to be 100,000 cases filed tomorrow morning?" 100 Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest keeping the test in at least some form, asking "does it not serve to show us at least one way in which there can be obviousness?" 1 0 1 Of course, no substantive conclusions can be drawn from the Justices' questions; for that, only time and a published opinion will suffice. patent law than other recent cases on injunctions, licenses, and obviousness, it is significant because of its international implications in a world where borders seem to hem in intellectual property less than ever before.
Microsoft v. AT&T concerns 35 U.S.C. §271(f), which attempts to limit infringement of United States patents abroad by making it an infringing act to supply or contribute to the supplying of components of a patented invention outside of the United States if those components are then used in a manner that would constitute infringement within the United States. 0 2 In this particular case, Microsoft incorporated a component of patented AT&T software into its own software, burnt the software onto Golden Master CDs, and then shipped the Golden Masters overseas. Two questions are at issue before the Supreme Court. The first is whether computer software qualifies as a "component" for purposes of § 271(f). 10 7 Should the Court find that it does, the second question concerns the breadth of what is considered to be "supplied" from the United States-here foreign-produced copies of the U.S.-sourced software loaded onto computer hardware at foreign locations.
8
At oral argument the Justices raised two possible issues. First, it appeared that the Court may use Microsoft v. AT&T as an opportunity to speak on the patentability of software, with Justice Breyer stating, "I take it that we are operating under the assumption that software is patentable? We have never held that in this Court, have we?" 10 9 Second, the Court seemed concerned by the implication of ruling in AT&T's favor, with Justice Breyer commenting that he was "frightened" of deciding for AT&T and then discovering "all kinds of transmissions of information have themselves and alone become components." ' 10 Whichever way the Court decides, the case will have significant implications for the software indus- try and possibly for the overall protection given to U.S. patents beyond U.S. borders.
B. TAKING THE HEAT?: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
Not all of the important or interesting decisions in patent law came out of the Supreme Court. In addition to the decisions outlined above, the following cases discussing inequitable conduct and claim construction have been selected for review in this Survey.
Inequitable Conduct
The Federal Circuit issued two significant opinions regarding the defense of inequitable conduct in 2006. "Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee breaches his or her duty to the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") of candor, good faith, and honesty."' a In particular, it may arise when the patentee fails to disclose material information to the PTO.112 In order to establish inequitable conduct, a litigant must show that the patent applicant withheld information material to patentability with an intent to mislead. 1 1 3 A finding of inequitable conduct renders the entire patent unenforceable. In Ferring B. V. v. Bar Labs., Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of inequitable conduct on summary judgment based on the patentee's failure to disclose a financial relationship between the applicant and declarants who provided statements in support of the applicationY u 5 The patent concerned an improvement in the method of administering an antidiuretic composition to allow it to be taken via a solid oral dosage (i.e., swallowed). 1 6 At the'request of the patent office, patentee Ferring twice submitted declarations. Ferring submitted a first set of declarations to establish that the term "peroral" in a prior patent did not encompass swallowing. Following two examiner rejections and a separate rejection by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, Ferring submitted additional declarations to show that the proposed patent was not obvious." 7 The Federal Circuit explained that a relationship between an applicant and a declarant was material "if (1) the declarant's views on the underlying issue are material and (2) the past relationship to the applicant was a [Vol. 60 significant one." ' 1 18 Because the examiner's decision to accept the proposed claims clearly turned on the issues for which the PTO requested declarations, the Federal Circuit found the declarant's views material.
9
Also, because three declarants received financial compensation from Ferring before, during, and/or after the submission of the declaration, the Federal Circuit found the relationship significant.
120
Regarding intent, the Federal Circuit found that intent to deceive may be inferred on summary judgment where there has been a failure to supply highly material information and if the summary judgment record establishes that (1) the applicant knew of the information; (2) the applicant knew or should have known of the materiality of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the withholding.' 2 '
The Federal Circuit found that Ferring satisfied all three of the above requirements: (1) Ferring was aware of its financial relationship with the declarants; (2) the nature and timing of the examiner's requests for information (i.e., after expressing concerns about validity and then following repeated rejections of the proposed claims) conveyed their materiality; and (3) Ferring provided no actual explanation for withholding the information, only arguing as to possible explanations. The Federal Circuit panel upheld the determination of the district court. It found "no clear error" in the district court's finding that the withheld information had "low" materiality. 130 The prior art withheld concerned a trade article describing a process similar to Kemin's patent. 13 1 However, there was no persuasive evidence that the article's method would produce the composition disclosed, and PIVEG made no argument as to why the article had high materiality. 132 Without more, the Federal Circuit found no basis for finding clear error.1
33
Regarding intent, the district court had found intent "tenuous" and that the jury's finding of intent was "reached on a shallow basis."' 1 34
Kemin's president had explained that he did not provide the article because he believed the method described did not produce lutein fit for human consumption, which the district court found plausible. 35 Kemin's president had done some prior experiments using the article's methods, but these experiments had occurred two years prior to the prosecution of the patent application, the president was not an inventor of the patent, and he was only tangentially involved in its prosecution. 136 The Federal Circuit panel found that these facts mitigated against a finding of deceptive intent and found no error in the district court's determination.1
37
The Federal Circuit opinion then explained that "[e]ven when a court finds that the patentee failed to disclose material information to the PTO and acted with deceptive intent, the court retains discretion to decide whether the patentee's conduct is sufficiently culpable to render the patent unenforceable.' 1 38 Having found no error with the district court's determinations regarding materiality or intent, the panel affirmed the finding of no inequitable conduct. At the time of the decision, Amgen had undergone almost ten years of litigation.
143 Amgen brought a declaratory judgment action in April 1997, alleging that Hoechst Marion Roussel's new application for a product based on the hormone erythropoietin ("EPO") infringed its patents. 144 After remand, the case returned to the Federal Circuit for review of the district court's construction of the term "therapeutically effective amount," and the determinations resulting therefrom. 145 In a 2-1 panel decision, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in its construction of the term "therapeutically effective amount.
'' 14 6 Amgen submitted a petition for rehearing en banc, which the Federal Circuit denied. 147 However, along with the denial of rehearing en banc, eight of the twelve judges filed concurring or dissenting opinions.
1 48 Several judges dissented for the specific purpose of reconsidering Cybor. Chief Judge Michel, who also dissented in the above panel decision, authored a dissent joined by Judges Rader, Newman, and Moore in which he said of Cybor: "I have come to believe that reconsideration is appropriate and revision may be advisable."' 1 49 He then outlined four problems with the current regime:
(1) a steadily high reversal rate; (2) a lack of predictability about appellate outcomes, which may confound trial judges and discourage settlements; (3) loss of the comparative advantage often enjoyed by the district judges who heard or read all of the evidence and may have spent more time on the claim constructions than we ever could on appeal; and (4) inundation of our court with the minutia of conif it received evidence of infringement regarding that claim through discovery. Michel concluded his dissent by stating, "I believe the time has come for us to re-examine Cybor's no deference rule. I hope that we will do so at our next opportunity, and I expect we will.
' 151
The other dissenting judges had similar themes. Judge Newman authored his own dissent in which he first criticized the panel's decision to overturn the district court's construction and then concluded by asserting the need to "rethink the optimum approach," suggesting that standards similar to those used in the review of mixed scientific fact and law for determinations on expert testimony may prove useful.
152 Judge Rader cited the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 153 for support of the position that claim construction was not a purely legal issue and should not be reviewed as such. 154 Finally, Judge Moore also authored a dissent, stating both that the original district court claim construction was correct and that the Federal Circuit should have taken the case en banc to reconsider Cybor. 155 Additionally, three concurring judges, Gajarasa, Linn, and Dyk, also indicated a willingness to revisit Cybor, even though they agreed with the denial of an en banc rehearing of Amgen. Their decision to concur in the denial was not "an unqualified endorsement of the en banc decision in Cybor.. .-156 They indicated they would be willing to reconsider Cybor if the "appropriate case" arose-one where the district court needed to rely on conflicting expert evidence to interpret claim terms.
57
Following Amgen, it now appears that at least eight members of the twelve judge circuit are willing to revisit the position of giving no deference to district court claim construction established in Cybor. In addition to the dissents of Michel, Newman, Rader, and Moore, Judge Mayer criticized Cybor on similar grounds in his dissent from the court in Phillips v. AWH Corp. 158 These five combine with the three Amgen concurring judges looking for an "appropriate case." It seems only a matter of time until such a case arrives before the Federal Circuit. These proposed reforms could have a wide-ranging impact on the patent system, but with Congressional control changing parties in the new legislative session, the extent these proposals will continue is uncertain.
A new proposal that appears to have some momentum involves not changing patent law but instead reconfiguring the courts in which patent cases are heard. Currently only a pilot program, H.R. 5418, passed the house last September and, as H.R. 34, has done so again this year, both times under the sponsorship of Representative Darrell Issa. 16 1 The pilot program would last no longer than ten years and would designate particular "patent judges" in not less than five district courts in three different circuits. 162 In these districts, non-designated judges would have the option of turning any patent case they received over to a pool of designated patent judges, one of whom would be randomly selected to hear the case. 163 The proposal seeks to allow certain judges to build expertise in patent cases while maintaining a large enough pool so that assignment is not predetermined when a case is filed. In order for a district to qualify it must be one of the fifteen district courts with the largest number of patent cases filed, and it must have at least ten judges, three of which have volunteered to be designated as patent judges. 66 Originally, the protection of trademarks had, as a purpose, preventing confusion in the marketplace; in theory, consumers benefit from having the ability to identify both a product's identity and quality by the product's mark. 167 In contrast to trademark confusion, actions for trademark dilution usually arise from the utilization of another's mark for different, unrelated products. The danger is not that a customer may think the two products are the same, but rather that the mark will lose significance or meaning.
The TDRA has two primary effects. First, and most importantly, it overturns the Supreme Court's decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., where the Court held that proof of actual dilution was required.
168
In Moseley, plaintiff Victoria's Secret alleged that its eponymous mark was infringed by the defendant's store, Victor's Little Secret, which sold lingerie and adult novelty items.' 69 The Plaintiff was successful at both the district and appellate court, but the Supreme Court reversed, applying a plain-language interpretation to the statute to find that "evidence of dilution" referred to evidence of actual dilution, not merely the likelihood of dilution. unrelated product, lessening the mark's significance or meaning. 173 Tarnishment also lessens a mark's significance or meaning but does so more actively, as when the mark is used for a product that itself has a negative connotation for quality or standing in the eyes of the public.
174
In defining these causes of action, the TDRA also does much to clarify and standardize how courts should decide dilution cases. It outlines factors for courts to assess in determining dilution and gives definitions for both blurring and tarnishment. 175 It also defines a "famous" mark as "widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States."' 1 76 Because a mark must be famous in order to receive federal protection, marks that are only famous within a product niche or a geographic area are not protected. 1 77 Finally, the TDRA also defines a new "fair-use" defense to dilution. The Fifth Circuit addressed the sufficiency of evidence necessary to prove knowledge of counterfeit goods in United States v. Zheng Xiao Yi. 80 In Zheng, the United States seized two shipments of counterfeit goods, which it determined were headed for Zheng Xiao Yi's store.
18 ' Upon his arrest, Zheng allegedly confessed to knowing that certain goods 175. The non-exclusive list of factors for determining "dilution by blurring" is: (i) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark; (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark; (iv) the 
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SMU LAW REVIEW in his store were counterfeit. 182 The jury convicted Zheng on all six counts of the indictment. 183 However, the Fifth Circuit vacated the conviction with regard to the sixth count which pertained to counterfeit Nike sandals seized from the second shipment. 184 In order to find Zheng guilty, the government had to prove that "the defendant knew that the mark so used was counterfeit.
' 185 Zheng's inventory contained a mix of counterfeit and legitimate goods and his admissions only pertained to the items in his current inventory. 186 Agents found no sandals in Zheng's store or warehouse. 187 The government presented no direct evidence to show that Zheng knew the Nike sandals were counterfeit, and the Fifth Circuit found the inference arising from the knowledge of other counterfeit goods insufficient.
188
Congress also addressed counterfeit marks, broadening the applicability of 18 U.S.C. section 2320, which provides criminal penalties for unlicensed trafficking in trademarked goods. On March 16, 2006, President Bush signed the Protecting American Goods and Services Act of 2005, aimed at the trafficking of counterfeit marks independent of the products they identify. 189 Prior to the new legislation, section 2320(a) was limited to trafficking in marks used in conjunction with a good or service. 190 This limitation left a loophole: counterfeiters could import unmarked goods separately from trademark labels. The labels could be quickly attached in the United States, and the completed counterfeits sold. Trademark owners had little power to stop such activities at the border.
The new anti-counterfeiting bill expanded the scope of the section to include the traffic in the labels themselves.
1 91 As a result, the traffic of counterfeit labels may now result in criminal liability even if the labels are divorced from the goods or services with which the mark is associated. Pham sent Jones several letters asking Jones to discontinue using the brochure and letter and registered his letter and brochure with the Register of Copyrights. 196 Then, when Jones still failed to stop using the materials, Pham sued for copyright infringement. 1 97 The court entered a preliminary injunction preventing Jones from continuing to use the letter and brochure. 198 After the injunction was issued, Jones made some changes to the brochure and letter, but kept using both. 199 The district court reviewed the modified letter and found it substantially similar. 200 Jones still used a format nearly identical to Pham's and had not changed the text of the letter "except for six instances in which Jones changed one word or added minor phrases to a sentence." ' 20 1 Finding infringement, the district court awarded damages equal to Jones's total revenue during the period of infringement, less expenses and attorneys fees, totaling over $43,000. While DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd. 20 3 involves patents, it discusses issues raised by the most significant copyright opinion in recent years-the Supreme Court's opinion in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 204 Grokster involved a lawsuit by copyright holders against distributors of free software that allowed its users to share electronic files without a central server. 20 5 The distributors were aware that users mainly used their software to download copyrighted files but argued that they could not be held contributorily liable because their software had substantial non-infringing uses. 20 6 Defendant's based this position on their reading of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court's prior opinion on secondary infringement of copyright. 20 7 In Sony, the Court intent that must be established to support a claim for contributory infringement. 22 1 The Federal Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's discussion of contributory infringement in Grokster. " [M] ere knowledge of possible infringement by others does not amount to inducement; specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven. '222 Further, the Federal Circuit found that "Grokster has clarified that the intent requirement for inducement requires more than just intent to cause the acts that produce direct infringement.
IV. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
2 23 "Accordingly, inducement requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another's infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer's activities. '22 4 Thus, as a result of the earlier mentioned lack of evidence and the clarified requirements to show intent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to grant a new trial with respect to the jury's finding of ITL's non-infringement. Intellectual property continues to escalate in importance to the world, United States, and East Texas economies. With that rising importance comes increased scrutiny. 2007 will be another significant year in the ongoing development of our intellectual property laws. At the state level, Texas will continue to be instrumental in the development of intellectual property law-from the Northern and Southern District of Texas looking at crafting local patent rules, to the Eastern District of Texas continuing to be a national focal point. At the national level, legislative reform may happen, and obviously the Supreme Court will continue to hand down decisions that will impact patents and patent litigation. Copyright laws will be examined and interpreted in light of new services like YouTube®. Search engines such as Google® will continue to focus attention on the value, usefulness, and boundaries of trademarks. Technology is pushing the economy in new directions with ever-increasing speed, and the laws governing intellectual property are being crafted and interpreted to keep up. 
